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Chapter 31  Aid and Taxation 
 
Oliver Morrissey and Samantha Torrance 
[forthcoming in M. Arvin and B. Lew (eds), Handbook on the Economics of Foreign Aid, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015] 
 
31.1 Introduction 
The principal aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that there is no robust or consistent 
relationship between aid, in total or whether disaggregated into grants and loans, and tax 
revenue. We demonstrate that although we can replicate the negative coefficient on aid 
variables in a tax revenue regression that is often claimed to show that aid reduces tax 
effort (Gupta et al, 2004; Benedek et al, 2012) this is not a robust finding. Specifically, we 
show that significance of coefficients on the aid variables can be eliminated by altering the 
specification or estimator or by introducing lags to aid or by altering the sample. 
Furthermore, changing the analysis from using annual observations to using sub-period 
averaged data one can obtain results that suggest a positive effect of aid on tax revenue 
(Clist and Morrissey, 2011; Morrissey et al, 2014) but these results also are not very 
robust. We conclude that no general claims that aid reduces (or increases) tax effort are 
credible; although it is easy to find associations between aid and tax in the data, these are 
inherently fragile and can often be explained by structural characteristics of the countries 
(factors associated with low tax are also associated with high aid). There is no reason to 
assert that aid has any consistent effect on tax effort. 
 The previous literature used IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS), sometimes 
supplemented with internal IMF data, but these are known to suffer from missing data, 
mixed data from different sources (with different definitions of tax) and are inconsistent in 
how resource revenues are treated. In contrast, we employ recent cross-country data on tax 
revenue in developing countries drawn from the new International Centre for Tax and 
Development Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD), see Prichard, Cobham and 
Goodall (2014).  While the ICTD GRD merges data from various sources it contains more 
than 20% more observations for developing countries and is more accurate through careful 
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data merging using consistent definitions and distinguishing between tax and non-tax 
revenue. 
 This chapter should not be interpreted as suggesting in any way that aid is not relevant 
to tax or fiscal policy (it may be interpreted as implying that the amount of aid has no 
consistent effect on the level of tax revenue). Insofar as aid receipts are a known and 
observed source of revenue to recipient governments it is likely that expectations of aid 
influence government tax and borrowing decisions. Nevertheless, there can be no 
presumption regarding the magnitude or even direction of such effects, especially because 
donors endeavour to introduce a link, that they can monitor, between aid given directly to a 
government and public expenditure by that government (see Clist et al, 2012). In general, 
aid finances some elements of spending and the government finances the rest. In 
association with aid, such as through technical assistance or conditionality, donors support 
and promote policy and administrative reforms that can have important effects on tax and 
fiscal policy (see Prichard et al, 2012). It is the nature of the relationship and policy 
dialogue between donors and recipients that influences tax policy, not the volume of aid. 
 The specific focus on aid and taxation notwithstanding, our analysis has important 
lessons for any attempt to infer the effects of aid on indicators of economic performance 
using cross-country growth regressions: the methodology is not fit for purpose because the 
data are characterised by heterogeneity across countries. There is no simple general 
relationship. This is a rather obvious point because aid is multifaceted and varied; each of 
the many donors gives different types of aid in different amounts, with differing 
procedures and to serve varying motivations. Similarly, the structures and characteristics of 
economies and policy actions of governments vary so, for example, how a particular 
constellation of characteristics including aid relate to overall tax revenue (or growth) in 
one country may not be similar or even comparable to another country. We believe that 
even if this is an obvious argument it is too often ignored and therefore deserves emphasis. 
 There is also a methodological implication for how researchers can assess evidence on 
the effects of aid. Our approach is simple: start with an established paper (Gupta et al, 
2004) that makes an explicit claim (aid reduces tax effort, especially if in the form of 
grants), analyse the data to demonstrate that we can reproduce their result, and then show 
how easily the result can be made to µdisappear¶ (i.e. show that significance is not robust). 
%\ LPSOLFDWLRQ WKH µDOWHUQDWLYH¶ UHVXOW LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH of a positive effect of aid on tax 
since the mid-1980s (Clist and Morrissey, 2011) is equally subject to the same criticism 
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and may not be robust. This is achieved by nothing more complicated than altering 
specification or estimation method; any result that permits inferring a general effect must 
be robust to such exercises in replication, but results for aid and tax do not withstand such 
scrutiny.  
 Section 31.2 provides a brief overview of the existing literature using cross-country 
regression analysis to test for the effect of aid on tax revenue and discusses reasons why 
we should not expect a consistent relationship between aid and tax revenue. We restrict 
attention to this cross-FRXQWU\RUµODUJH1¶OLWHUDWXUHIRUFRPSDFWQHVVDQGGRQRWFRQVLGHU
literature on the effect of donor programmes on tax policy (reviewed in Prichard et al, 
2012) or country studies of the fiscal effects of aid (reviewed in Morrissey, 2014). Section 
31.3 outlines the econometric approaches adopted in the literature and presents our results. 
Section 31.4 concludes with a brief discussion of implications. 
 
31.2 Existing Views on Aid and Taxation 
There has been much discussion as to whether aid is a substitute for or complement to 
domestically raised revenue. The prevailing argument in the empirical literature is that aid 
discourages tax collection EHFDXVH WKH VHFXULW\ SURYLGHG E\ µHDV\¶ UHYHQXH IURP GRQRUV
reduces the urgency for collecting domestic revenue (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Gupta 
et al, 2004).  An alternative view is that aid can support domestic revenue mobilization 
because the revenue security and donor support for reform encourages recipient 
governments to undertake more risky policy and investment decisions than they would 
usually take if they were solely reliant on domestic resources. Gupta (2007) and Brun et al 
(2009) find evidence of a positive relationship, in the latter case contingent on a strong 
institutional environment. Clist and Morrissey (2011) find evidence of a structural break so 
that since the late 1980s aid has been associated with increases in tax revenue. This result 
is attributed to the possible effects of policy reforms for both improved tax effort and 
increases in the tax base. A number of studies find no robust relationship between aid and 
tax revenues (Teera and Hudson, 2004), especially when more flexible econometric 
techniques, such as panel time series and group fixed effects estimators, are used (Carter, 
2013).  
 In considering how aid, or more importantly donor influence, relates to tax mobilization 
the capacity building and transfer of knowledge from donors through technical assistance 
should not be neglected (Goldsmith, 2011). Aid-financed donor projects have the potential 
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to strengthen weak tax institutions, improve the formulation of tax policy and design of 
legislation and address capacity constraints in administration and enforcement agencies 
(Moore, 2014). However, such administrative and institutional reforms are difficult to 
design and implement and the evidence on their effectiveness is mixed at best (Andrews, 
2013). Reform efforts and outcomes are inherently country-specific so it is probable that 
the same is true for the relationship between aid and tax.  
  A legitimate generalisation is that largely unobserved country-specific factors are the 
principal determinants of tax ratios.  Aid may be a factor, although how government fiscal 
behaviour is influenced depends at least as much on the relationship with donors as the 
volume of aid. The political economy literature argues that agents do not like paying taxes 
so if governments can cover expenditure with aid they have less need to expend political 
effort in collecting unpopular taxes. Although aid does not cover all expenditure it may 
reduce the incentive for tax effort. While such a political cost in raising taxes exists, there 
is also a political cost in aid dependence. It is reasonable to assume that governments make 
a decision assessing the political cost of aid against that of increasing taxes. It is not 
obvious that always means they will chose less tax effort. 
 Consider three types of political costs associated with aid and tax: bureaucracy, 
accountability and autonomy. The bureaucratic costs refer to costs of tax administration 
compared to the costs of officials from various ministries interacting with donors. The 
latter is more a function of the number of donors than the amount of aid (and even if 
donors that provide more aid are more demanding of time from officials they may also 
provide more technical assistance for tax reform). Furthermore, as donors apply more and 
changing requirements on monitoring aid they are increasing aid costs to government. 
Over the last decade or so many low income aid recipients have implemented tax 
administration and fiscal reforms (Moore, 2014) so the bureaucratic costs of taxation have 
probably been reduced. Furthermore, these reforms often relate to improving the efficiency 
of tax collection, such as autonomous revenue authorities (Baskaran et al, 2015), so tax 
ratios can increase without increasing tax rates. In terms of bureaucratic costs the trend is 
likely to favour taxes over aid. 
 The costs of accountability refer to whom and what extent the government has to 
account for how it uses revenue and are likely to be greater for aid. Donors exert effort to 
monitor use and to ensure the government can account for the use of aid (as the donor 
agency is accountable to its own constituency). They also attach policy reform conditions, 
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often relating to public financial management or tax administration; effort has to be 
expended by the government in negotiating with donors and it is not costless to avoid 
complying with conditionality. In contrast, accountability to taxpayers is very weak in the 
low income countries that are the major recipients of aid. Furthermore, governments may 
face greater constraints on how they can use aid than for other sources of revenue. 
Comparing aid to resource (oil) revenues, Altincekic and Bearce (2014) provide empirical 
support for the argument that, because aid is less fungible and subject to conditionality, 
governments are less able to use aid to fund repression or appeasement (so there is no 
political aid curse). The costs of accountability are likely to be higher for aid than for 
taxation, at least where the tax system is weak and revenues are relatively low, i.e. in those 
countries where aid receipts are likely to be high. 
 Considering an autonomous government as one that can make independent decisions 
and policy choices there is a benefit from autonomy, so the costs of autonomy lie in its 
absence. Governments dislike being overly dependent on aid if this requires them to cede 
some policy influence to donors; even limited conditionality is a constraint on policy 
action. Increasing domestic revenue enhances autonomy, which will appeal to many 
governments, especially those that are accountable to domestic constituencies. To the 
extent that governments dislike ceding autonomy to foreign influences they will have a 
preference for increasing taxes relative to aid. 
 This line of argument implies an increasing tendency for governments to prefer to 
increase domestic revenue than accept aid because the political costs of aid are higher. To 
the extent that low income countries continue to rely on aid it is in part because they are 
constrained in their ability to raise sufficient domestic revenue to finance the level of 
expenditure that generates political gains. This implies that a focus on the amount of aid is 
misleading as it is the fiscal and administrative reforms promoted by donors and supported 
through aid that will have an impact of tax performance. However, the cross-country 
literature has tended to focus on the amount of aid, and this is the main reason we expect 
the findings not to be robust. 
 Perhaps the paper that is considered the greatest proponent of the negative relationship 
between the amount of aid and tax effort is Gupta et al (2004).  Using a panel data set of 
107 developing countries over the period 1970-2000 for their empirical analysis, they find 
evidence of a negative relationship between aid and tax revenue and also argue that that the 
composition of aid matters, with loans, which need to be repaid, encouraging collection, 
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but grants discouraging tax effort.  Clist and Morrissey (2011) replicate the Gupta et al 
(2004) findings but argue that this is due to a misspecification of the relationship of 
interest. Specifically, Gupta et al (2004) model a contemporaneous correlation between aid 
and tax collection.  However, in a given year, higher aid, especially grants, is likely to be 
associated across countries with lower tax/GDP because the poorest countries tend to have 
lower tax/GDP ratios and tend to receive more aid, particularly in the form of grant. This is 
because other country characteristics determine both low tax and high aid, not because aid 
influences tax effort. Clist and Morrissey (2011) argue that lagging aid by one or two years 
when using annual data does not fully account for this endogeneity, particularly as 
tax/GDP ratios tend to exhibit persistence (at least over short periods).   
 To allow for an effect of aid on tax effort one must consider what lags are appropriate 
for aid received to affect behaviour. The behaviour of policymakers, tax administrations 
and enforcement agencies change only slowly. Although the anticipation of aid may create 
an incentive to reduce tax effort, it seems at least equally likely that policies associated 
with aid (conditionality and technical assistance) will have effects on tax revenue (on rates, 
bases or collection). Clist and Morrissey (2011) find that since the mid-1980s low-income 
aid recipients have managed to increase tax ratios, suggesting that the policies associated 
with aid may have supported increasing tax/GDP ratios. However, some policies 
associated with aid tend to reduce tax revenue; economic liberalization has typically been a 
component of conditional lending (aid increases) and such reform episodes, especially in 
trade policy, are generally associated with tax revenue reductions (Baunsgaard and Keen, 
2005; Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2009). In this way, aid conditionality may actually generate 
a negative association between aid/GDP and tax/GDP ratios in the short-run. This helps to 
explain why some studies find a negative correlation between aid and tax ratios, but this is 
not due to a behavioural effect of aid reducing tax effort. The controls that are generally 
included in tax effort studies to proxy for the tax base (such as agriculture and industry 
shares in the economy, income per capita, imports and exports) cannot adequately account 
for these policy effects. In simple terms, aid is likely to shape tax performance through 
multiple channels - behavioural effects, conditionality, policy and technical assistance - 
and these country-specific effects may move in different directions, are difficult to 
distinguish from each other and thus confound empirical analysis.   
 Responding to the challenges of Clist and Morrissey (2011), Benedek et al (2012) 
replicated and expanded the initial Gupta et al (2004) study using a more recent (1980-
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2009) and comprehensive tax revenue dataset for 118 countries. They also explored the 
robustness of the results (considering income groups, regional groups, controls for 
institutions), finding that the results are robust across samples, although the negative 
impact of aid on tax effort appears greater in weak institutional environments. Benedek et 
al (2012) base their claim that the negative result is robust on the use of a Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. Although GMM estimators are popular because of 
the potential to address certain endogeneity problems, Carter (2013) argues that the 
required conditions are unlikely to be satisfied given the nature of the relationship between 
aid and taxation. Clist (2014) shows that the IMF data combines different sources and 
changes in sources between years often generate large apparent changes in tax/GDP (but 
these are changes in measure, not in actual tax). These are then built in to the instruments 
used in GMM so the results in Benedek et al (2012) are unlikely to be as robust as they 
claim. Furthermore, they do not address the principal concern raised by Clist and 
Morrissey (2011) that because any effect of aid on tax effort is behavioural it will take a 
considerable number of years to affect tax effort and any effects will vary across countries 
(and over time). For these reasons we do not use GMM, but do employ estimators 
comparable to Gupta et al (2004). 
 
31.3 Revisiting the Relationship with New Data 
The analysis reported here employs an annual panel dataset for comparability with Gupta 
et al (2004). Covering the period 1980-2010, the sample consists of data for 89 developing 
countries: 46 from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 22 from Asia and the Pacific (AsiaPac) and 
21 from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) (see Appendix Table 31.A1).1  The tax 
revenue variable is taken from the ICTD GRD and is only available with sufficient 
coverage from 1980.2  Most of the ICTD data is sourced from GFS, individual country 
                                                          
1
 :HRQO\LQFOXGHFRXQWULHVIRUZKLFKWKH*5'GDWDLVFODVVHGDVµJRRG¶TXDOLW\DQGIRUZKLFKDLG
was at least 0.5% of GDP on average over the period (to exclude negligible recipients). Unlike 
Benedek et al (2012) we exclude countries from the Middle East and North Africa given the very 
low levels of aid received, if any, over the time period and European transition economies and 
those established from the former Yugoslavia given that they have quite different characteristics to 
developing countries.  Some former Soviet Union countries are included where there are revenue 
and aid data (usually from 1990) and listed under the AsiaPac heading.  
2
 This dataset was constructed to address missing data, data reliability, and differences across 
sources in definitions and recording of revenue variables and clearly separating revenues from 
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,0) $UWLFOH ,9 UHSRUWV DQG WKH UHVSHFWLYH FRXQWU\¶V RZQ QDWLRQDO EXGJHW  Control 
variables DUHFRPSLOHGIURPWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V:RUOG'HYHlopment Indicators and data on 
net aid, grants and loans as a percentage of GDP are sourced from the OECD-DAC. A list 
of the data sources and summary statistics are provided in Appendix Tables 31.A2 and 
31.A3 respectively. 
 Figure 31.1 illustrates the evolution of tax/GDP ratios in the sample over the period 
1980-2010, with the dispersion by countries plotted for 3-5 year averages and the simple 
average across the sample for each year (the µmeanrev¶ line). This shows a gentle decline 
in the mean ratio until the late 1990s, then an increase but remarkably little growth in the 
average over the entire period, highlighting a general persistence. A similar pattern is 
observed for the dispersion excluding outliers. The outliers are typically small Pacific 
island states and Botswana displaying higher rates than other countries. There is some 
evidence for a general increase in the tax/GDP ratio since about 1998. 
Figures 31.1 to 31.3 about here 
 Figure 31.2 presents the corresponding dispersion of the net aid to GDP ratio and again 
outliers are mostly Pacific islands (which given their very small populations and almost 
complete dependence on aid generate net aid to GDP ratios in excess of 50%) and post-
conflict states such as Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The extent of 
outliers has declined since the late 1980s. Average net aid to GDP has remained relatively 
constant over the period, although there was a minor peak in the early 1990s; to some 
extent this is DPLUURULPDJHRIWD[*'3FRQILUPLQJWKHK\SRWKHVLVRIDµQDWXUDO¶QHJDWLYH
contemporaneous correlation.  Figure 31.3 serves to make the important point that loans, as 
a share of aid, are very low; always less that one per cent of GDP on average and generally 
negligible since the mid-1990s. Grants are by far the most important component of aid, 
especially for lower income countries. 
Figures 31.4 to 31.6 about here 
 Figure 31.4 shows that the weak contemporaneous relationship between aid and tax is 
largely due to outliers (the correlation is merely -0.03). As illustrated in Figure 31.5 a 
similar contemporaneous relationship is evident between grants and tax (but the correlation 
is only -0.02). Figure 31.6 shows effectively no relationship between loans and tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
natural resource exploration. It is available from www.ictd.org with documentation (Prichard, 
Cobham and Goodall, 2014).  
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(correlation -0.01). Simply by looking at the scatter plots one would not anticipate a 
significant effect of aid on tax for the sample. 
 The analysis estimates the standard tax structure equation (31.1) following Gupta et al 
(2004) and Clist and Morrissey (2011). We use the limited set of controls that are standard 
in the literature but test robustness to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables (see 
Table 31.3 and discussion).   
    ቀ ௧௔௫ீ஽௉ቁ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܩܦܲ݌ܿ ൅ ߚଶܣܩܴ ൅ ߚଷܫܰܦ ൅ ߚସܯ൅ ߚହܺ ൅ ߚ଺ܽ݅݀ ൅ ߚ଻ܽ݅݀ଶ ൅ ߝ                                                                    
 
 The dependent variable is the natural log of the tax/GDP ratio (as the ratio itself is not 
normally distributed). The level of income (GDPpc), share of industry in the economy 
(IND) and trade/GDP ratios for imports (M) and exports (X) are all expected to be 
positively associated with tax/GDP,3 whereas the share of agriculture (AGR) is expected to 
be negative reflecting the difficulty in taxing small producers. In the analyses aid is also 
disaggregated into grants and loans, accounting for a non-linear effect with the inclusion of 
an aid squared term.  This aims to capture the possibility that above a certain threshold 
additional increases in aid may have a more detrimental effect on tax revenue (in terms of 
the discussion in section 31.2, highly aid dependent countries may have no desire or ability 
to exercise the political calculus in favour of raising taxes). Whilst a relatively 
parsimonious model is pursued here, a number of other variables have been included in the 
literature. In sensitivity analysis we include additional proxy measures of variables that 
have often been significant (and are also included in Gupta et al, 2004): whether or not the 
country is an oil producer (oil); the rate of inflation (inf) to capture macroeconomic 
instability; and the degree of corruption (icrg) as an indicator of institutional quality.   
 One of the major challenges to the empirical analysis of the relationship between aid 
and tax revenues is the quality and availability of data, in particular that of general 
                                                          
3
 Although Gupta et al (2004) combine exports and imports in a single openness variable we follow 
Clist and Morrissey (2011) and include them separately as they may have distinct effects. Imports 
proxy for tariff revenue and most countries reduced tariffs, often significantly, during the period. 
Although some countries still tax exports, most eliminated major export taxes in the 1980s so 
exports are not inherently sources of revenue (a positive coefficient would suggest that the export 
sector supports economic activity that generates revenue). 
(31.1) 
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government and tax revenues. As Prichard et al (2014) note, there is a high degree of 
selection bias in the revenue data sets that are available with missing data in resource-rich 
countries, conflict states and those with poor relationships with international finance 
institutions (IFIs) being under-represented. Whilst attempts have been made to address 
these shortcomings in this analysis through the use of a newly compiled and cleaned 
dataset from ICTD, missing observations remain a concern, and acknowledgement is made 
of the fact that various sources of data have been accessed for its compilation.   
 From an econometric perspective, addressing the potential endogeneity between aid and 
taxation is a central theme in the literature and also a source of critique (Carter, 2013).  
This dual causality arises from the fact that aid volume, as well as the aid mix, may be 
affected by the expenditure, taxation and domestic financing decisions of a recipient 
government. More generally, poor countries that attract aid also tend to have a weak tax 
base, hence low tax ratios; aid flows are typically higher to countries that have more 
difficulty in raising domestic revenues because such countries tend to be poorer. Authors 
typically tackle this endogeneity by lagging aid by periods of various lengths and we adopt 
that approach for comparability with Gupta et al (2004).4  However, any lag length implies 
an assumption of the timeline for which aid is likely to affect tax effort behaviour and this 
is likely to be highly contingent on the donor-recipient relationship, the associated policies 
and other country-specific factors (Prichard et al, 2012).  Our strategy is to experiment 
with various lag lengths; as developing countries, especially low-income countries, have 
limited ability to alter tax revenue in the short to medium term (Keen and Simone, 2004; 
Morrissey, 2014) longer lags are more appropriate to capture embedded behaviour due to 
aid.  
 Note that if the true endogeneity is that recipient revenue performance influences donor 
aid allocation the use of lags is sufficient, but if the underlying problem is that structural 
characteristics determine both (low) revenue and (high) aid the use of lags alone may not 
be sufficient because characteristics change slowly. For example, countries that have a 
narrow production structure (given endowments) and depend on a narrow range of 
commodities for export earnings may have trade deficits that attract aid financing and low 
                                                          
4
 Brun et al (2009) use an instrumental variable approach and results are not noticeably different to 
employing lags. 
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tax revenues given the disincentive effect of taxing too heavily the few potentially dynamic 
(export) sectors of the economy. 
 
Econometric Results 
The basic findings of Gupta et al (2004) and Benedek et al (2012) are assessed through 
replication of their core specification using the new dataset with pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and panel fixed effects (FE) estimators applied to annual data to estimate 
equation (31.1).  We then extend the analysis to consider alternative estimators and 
additional variables. In recognition of the presence of serial correlation in the error terms 
given the use of annual data, feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) and panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) estimators are also employed. As these estimators are sufficient to 
demonstrate that the results are not robust, we do not employ the GMM technique used in 
Benedek et al (2012).5   
 Table 31.1 reports the results of a pooled OLS estimation using the annual dataset.  If 
the aid variables are not lagged net aid has a negative and significant coefficient, whilst the 
coefficients on grants and loans have a positive and negative sign respectively, but are 
statistically insignificant.  Once a 5-year (or 3-year, not reported) lag is introduced, the 
coefficient on loans remains insignificant but results for grants become statistically 
significant. The same pattern of results is true for the longer 10-year lag, and the 
magnitude of the positive coefficient on grants increases. The controls are significant 
(except for GDPpc) and coefficients are very stable; the F statistic of joint significance is 
statistically significant and the overall explanatory power of the model (R2) is sufficient. 
As poorer countries have larger shares of agriculture, controlling for the negative effect of 
AGR tax ratios tend to fall as per capita income rises.  Additionally, there is a negative 
effect of IND on tax ratios (so industry is not operating as the tax base that would be 
expected).  The effect of imports is positive and significant, consistent with the importance 
of tariff revenue and may also proxy for economic activity (growth associated with 
increasing demand for imports). The negative coefficient on exports suggests this may 
proxy for the adverse effect of economic instability (as captured by export volatility), and 
                                                          
5
 The GMM approach is useful to allow for endogeneity if unobserved country-specific effects also 
vary over time, albeit at a cost of requiring additional assumptions. Typically, GMM is employed 
to test the robustness of OLS and/or FE estimates rather than an alternative estimator when these 
are found not to be robust, as in the case here. Carter (2012) shows that GMM is not necessarily 
robust. 
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may also capture the difficulty of taxing resource exports (noting that resource revenues 
are excluded from the tax measure).6 We wait until after all results before interpreting 
these controls. 
Tables 31.1 and 31.2 about here 
 For the control variables, the OLS results are in line with Gupta et al (2004), but the aid 
variables are inconsistent. Table 31.2 presents results using a Fixed Effects (FE) estimator. 
The only noticeable change for the controls is that exports are insignificant in almost all 
specifications (suggesting the country-specific effect may capture export volatility). 
Significant coefficient estimates remain for the aid variables, but at lower levels of 
statistical significance and magnitudes.  As the FE estimator has the merit of allowing for 
heterogeneity (unobserved country-specific effects) these results alone should caution 
against inferring any general effect of aid on tax revenue.   
 Following Gupta et al (2004) and Benedek et al (2012) we also include a number of 
additional variables: inflation (inf) represents macroeconomic instability; the institutional 
environment is captured by a measure of corruption (icrg); and a dummy variable for 
whether the country is an oil producer (oil).7 Table 31.3 presents the results: the aid 
variables are statistically insignificant.  Inflation has a negative and significant coefficient 
in line with expectations.  The measure of corruption is positive in line with how the 
variable is constructed, with higher values representing less corruption, i.e. a better 
institutional environment, but is statistically insignificant.8  The oil dummy is negative and 
statistically significant (the negative coefficient on exports become significant).  If the aid 
variables are lagged in this specification Loans remain statistically insignificant, however 
Grants are positive, statistically significant and quadratic in effect (results available on 
request). 
Table 31.3 about here 
                                                          
6
 Although the coefficients appear to offset each other (cautioning against combing both in an 
openness measure) note that imports are typically a larger share of GDP than exports. 
7
 Oil producers are: Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Brunei, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo Rep., 
Gabon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan and Venezuela. 
8
 Gupta et al (2004) rescale the ICRG corruption measure such that higher values indicate weaker 
institutions, thus the negative coefficient they find is contrary to the results presented here. 
13 
 
 The annual nature of our data raises a potential problem of serial or auto-correlation, i.e. 
that the errors generated are not independent of each other over time.  To address group-
wise heterogeneity and contemporaneous correlation, following Gupta et al (2004) we use 
a panel corrected standard errors (PSCE) model.9 This yields similar results to the FE 
estimates although the coefficient on Grants is statistically significant, with a positive 
coefficient (final column of Table 31.3). 
 As another way to address group-wise heterogeneity, contemporaneous correlation and 
serial correlation, we employ a feasible generalised least-squares (FGLS) estimator with 
both a common AR(1) correlation coefficient and panel specific AR(1) process. The aid 
variables are statistically insignificant in all lagged specifications and when the additional 
variables are included; when contemporaneous aid is used only Grants has a positive and 
significant coefficient (results available on request). Table 31.4 reports FGLS estimates for 
samples comprising only countries in the lowest quartile or lowest 50% classified by 
ICRG, i.e. countries with below average institutional quality, as in Gupta et al (2004) and 
Benedek et al (2012). Note that the controls become insignificant or only very weakly 
significant. The aid variables are all insignificant except grants lagged five (but not 10) 
years. The negative association between grants and tax is apparent in countries with low 
institutional quality; as long lags eliminate this significance it cannot be interpreted as clear 
evidence that grants reduce tax effort. The relatively long persistence in tax ratios imply 
that it is just as plausible that these results reflect the coincidence of low income, low tax 
ratios and poor institutional quality with relatively high grants receipts.10 
Tables 31.4 and 31.5 about here 
 The estimates presented here used annual observations from the ICTD GRD. Morrissey 
et al (2014) use the same data but organize it into a 4-year sub-period averaged panel (to 
smooth volatility and reflect the relatively persistent nature of the data). Table 31.5 
provides some of their basic results. In the case of no lags the aid variables are all 
insignificant whereas with a one period lag the coefficients on aid and grants (with the 
                                                          
9
 Within STATA the PCSE estimates linear cross-sectional time-series models where parameters 
are estimated by OLS or Prais-Winsten regression.  When computing the standard errors and 
variance-covariance estimates, it assumes that the disturbances are by default heterogeneous and 
contemporaneous correlated across panels. 
10
 We also estimated for sub-samples classified into regions (Africa, LAC and AsiaPac) but aid 
variables were all insignificant, and by decade (1980s, 1990s and 2000s) where aid variables were 
mostly insignificant and in the cases where grants was significant the coefficient was positive 
(results available on request). 
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latter only weakly significant) are positive (the negative squared terms suggest a 
diminishing effect). However, when they employ FGLS or split the sample into regions or 
decades the significant results for aid are mostly eliminated. Even using period averaged 
data the results are not robust. 
 
 31.4 Conclusions: Why Aid is not a Determinant of Tax Revenue 
Using a new source of tax revenue data in an annual panel we are able to replicate some of 
the basic results of Gupta et al (2004) and Benedek et al (2012), namely that net aid has a 
negative coefficient on tax revenues (but only using pooled OLS). When disaggregating 
aid we cannot reproduce their results; we find a positive rather than negative effect of 
grants when significant, while loans are almost always insignificant. This pattern of results 
generally holds whether using pooled OLS or other estimators (FE, RE, FGLS and PCSE).  
Including additional control variables highlights the lack of robustness of these results: in 
most cases the coefficients on aid variables are insignificant. Using four-year averaged 
panel data Morrissey et al (2014) also find no consistent robust relationship between aid, in 
total or when separating grants and loans, and tax performance. Where they do find 
significant coefficients these are positive for net aid and for grants, whereas for loans they 
are generally negative. The fragility of coefficient estimates on aid variables in a tax/GDP 
ratio equation justifies the conclusion that there is no robust or general relationship across 
countries. Certainly, there is no basis to infer that aid has any causal effect on tax revenue 
or tax effort. 
 The structure of the economy is an important determinant of tax revenues, but for the 
standard variables results are not very robust.  Countries with a higher share of agriculture 
in GDP have lower tax ratios; this reflects the acknowledged difficulties in taxing 
smallholder agriculture but is also likely to proxy for poor countries (the agriculture 
variable was only insignificant when we estimated for countries with below average 
quality of institutions, generally poorer countries). The share of industry in GDP was 
generally significant with a negative effect, which may suggest that this is not a good 
proxy for the private sector tax base, perhaps because multinationals and large companies 
have sophisticated tax management schemes.  There appears to be no direct relationship 
between per capita GDP (the proxy for the level of development of the country) and tax 
ratio, as even after controlling for sector structure the coefficient on GDPpc is statistically 
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insignificant. The negative coefficient on GPDpc may be attributable to relatively high 
income but low tax countries such as in East Asia. The effect of imports is positive when 
significant, consistent with the importance of tariff revenue and possibly also a proxy for 
economic activity (when inflation was used to capture economic instability imports 
became insignificant, and was also insignificant in the low institutional quality sub-
sample). The coefficient on exports was negative when significant, including when an oil 
dummy was included; this may reflect the adverse effect of volatile export earnings on 
economic activity and/or the difficulty of taxing the natural resource sector, given the 
importance of primary commodity exports for many low-income developing countries. 
 The replication-type analysis conducted here is not an attempt to summarise empirical 
findings in the literature, but rather aims to show that the results are fragile and 
insufficiently robust to permit any general inferences. This is one approach to assessing the 
evidence. Alternative approaches such as meta-regression analysis (MRA) are intended to 
summarise empirical results from many studies (see Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008 and 
chapter in this volume). The MRA approach is not appropriate in our case because there 
are too few sets of results to study and cross-country studies fail to capture inherent 
heterogeneity. Although there are now a number of aid-tax studies and all present many 
econometric results, there are relatively few directly comparable results using the same 
estimation method (and we have shown results are very sensitive to method). Although 
MRA is very robust when various studies estimate the same model in the same way, so the 
differences are primarily in sample and controls, it is not as useful in the presence of within 
sample heterogeneity and alternative models and estimators; in such cases the various 
studies are QRW µcomparing like with like¶ VR WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKe coefficient on the 
variable of interest varies and MRA estimates may be fragile (Mekasha and Tarp, 2013). 
Given the nature of the aid-tax relationship our approach of replication and sensitivity 
analysis is appropriate. 
Our principal conclusion is that there is no general effect of aid amounts on tax 
effort as the relationship between aid (more strictly donors) and tax revenue varies across 
countries and over time and this fundamental heterogeneity renders cross-country 
econometric analysis uninformative. There is no robust general or average effect and we 
cannot draw broad inferences (and certainly not causal inferences). The deeply 
inconclusive literature on aid effectiveness is another example of heterogeneity so that 
cross country regressions are not resilient to replication. Herzer and Morrissey (2013) 
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argue that the heterogeneous nature of the relationship arises because the effect of aid on 
GDP depends on a trade-off that is country specific: aid has a direct positive effect through 
financing investment but an indirect effect through aggregate productivity that can be 
negative (positive) if aid exacerbates (mitigates) growth-retarding factors such as poor 
governance. Using data for 59 developing countries over 1971-2003 they estimate country 
specific aid-output coefficients. On average these are negative, although in about a third of 
cases they are positive, but smaller than the positive investment-output coefficients;   
insofar as aid is used to finance investment the overall effect on output is likely to be 
positive. Similarly, observing a tendency for a negative association between aid and tax 
across countries does not imply that aid has a negative effect on revenue. 
 Although we make no claim that it is robust, our most common result is for a positive 
association between grants and tax revenue. This is at least consistent with donors 
supporting improvements in tax administration and with the argument in section 38.2 that 
the political calculus may encourage governments to prefer to increase domestic revenue 
than accept aid because the political costs of aid are higher. It is the characteristics 
associated with being a poor country that generate the observed correlation between high 
aid and low tax, because the same characteristics are associated with low tax. As countries 
experience economic growth and move from low to middle income status one typically 
observes a corresponding increase in tax revenues (as the tax base expands) and a decline 
in aid (as need diminishes). 
  Donors can support a transition to increasing domestic revenue and promoting 
autonomous domestically accountable governments through appropriate technical 
assistance for the design and implementation of tax administration and policy reforms, 
such as establishing independent revenue authorities, and increasing tax collection 
efficiency. This will help to reduce the bureaucratic costs of taxation. Donors should also 
recognise the revenue implications of policy reforms and assist governments in planning 
for adverse effects of reforms that may reduce revenue (such as trade liberalization). 
Governments are more likely to exert tax effort if they are persuaded that it promotes 
autonomy; they may even be willing to promote domestic accountability, if only because 
accountability to taxpayers is easier to manage than relations with donors. Focussing on the 
amount of aid is misleading as it is the fiscal and administrative reforms promoted by 
donors and supported through aid that will have an impact of tax performance. 
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Figure 31.1: Tax Revenue (% GDP), 1980-2010 
 
 
 Figure 31.2: Net Aid (% GDP), 1980-2010 
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Figure 31.3: Mean Aid (% GDP), 1980-2010 
 
 
Figure 31.4: Tax and Net Aid (% of GDP), 1980-2010 
 
Notes: Outliers - Palau (1994) 241.68; Palau (1995) 148.76 
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Figure 31.5: Tax and Grants (% of GDP), 1980-2010 
 
Notes: Outliers - Palau (1994) 241.68; Palau (1995) 148.76; Liberia (2008) 130.84 
 
Figure 31.6: Tax and Net Loans (% of GDP), 1980-2010 
 
Notes: Outliers - Liberia (2008) -34.5; Guyana (1991) -33.31 
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Table 31.1: Pooled OLS, Annual Panel  
 Aid not lagged Aid t-5 Aid t-10 
GDPpc 7.000e-6 5.800e-6 2.100e-6 2.000e-6 
 
(0.19) (1.42) (0.52) (0.50) 
AGR -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
 
(14.46)*** (14.53)*** (16.49)*** (15.01)*** 
IND -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
 
(7.76)*** (7.35)*** (7.47)*** (6.84)*** 
M 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 
(12.53)*** (13.13)*** (12.99)*** (13.08)*** 
X -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(2.75)*** (3.74)*** (3.45)*** (4.00)*** 
Aid -0.007    
 
(4.16)*** 
   
Aid2 0.000    
 
(2.20)** 
   
Loans  -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.09) (0.66) (0.29) 
Loans2  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.29) (1.60) (1.23) 
Grants  0.005 0.007 0.019 
  
(1.07) (1.74)* (3.61)*** 
Grants2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  
(1.65)* (1.38) (2.49)** 
_cons 2.700 2.652 2.696 2.636 
 
(50.83)*** (46.64)*** (47.59)*** (44.71)*** 
F  175.32 141.50 146.93 155.16 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2  0.41 0.43 0.45 0.47 
N 2,039 1,944 1,897 1,784 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(tax revenue/gdp); OLS estimator with robust standard 
errors: * denotes statistical significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  Test of 
joint significance of variables (F), associated p-value (P); R2 is the coefficient of 
determination; N the number of observations. Results for Grants and Loans 
(second column) similar if each entered separately. Results for lagged aid are 
similar with t-3 (lagged three years) except Loans insignificant. 
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Table 31.2: Panel FE Estimators, Annual Panel  
 Aid not lagged Aid t-5 Aid t-10 
GDPpc -3.000e-6 2.500e-6 5.400e-6 1.160e-6 
 
(0.72) (0.59) (1.28) (2.60)*** 
AGR -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 
 
(14.60)*** (13.36)*** (14.70)*** (14.45)*** 
IND -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 
 
(7.32)*** (6.08)*** (4.53)*** (2.34)** 
M 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
(3.78)*** (5.60)*** (4.08)*** (3.76)*** 
X -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(1.23) (1.90)* (1.43) (0.42) 
Aid -0.002    
 
(1.96)* 
   
Aid2 0.000    
 
(1.00) 
   
Loans  0.004 0.001 -0.005 
  
(1.43) (0.34) (1.35) 
Loans2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.18) (0.28) (0.32) 
Grants  0.000 0.004 0.007 
  
(0.11) (1.81)* (3.17)*** 
Grants2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(1.77)* (0.31) (2.89)*** 
_cons 3.019 2.909 2.916 2.831 
 
(60.46)*** (56.55)*** (55.88)*** (51.05)*** 
F  36.77 29.24 32.84 37.10 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2  0.12 0.12 0.14 0.16 
N 2,039 1,944 1,897 1,784 
Notes: As for Table 31.1 except estimated using panel fixed effects (FE) favoured over 
random effects (RE); all aid variables also insignificant using random effects with 
lagged aid. Test of joint significance of variables (F/chi2). Results for Grants and 
Loans (second column) similar if each entered separately except Grants 
significant and negative. Results for aid t-3 are similar to t-5. 
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Table 31.3: Annual Panel, Additional Regressors and PCSE 
 Panel RE estimator PCSE t-5 
GDPpc 4.500e-6 2.420e-5 2.21e-6 
 
(1.08) (2.69)*** (0.33) 
AGR -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 
 
(14.28)*** (10.73)*** (15.73)*** 
IND -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 
 
(7.06)*** (1.93)* (7.52)*** 
M 0.004 0.008 0.010 
 
(6.62)*** (8.77)*** (13.85)*** 
X -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(1.66)* (2.80)*** (3.41)*** 
Loans 0.004 0.003 -0.002 
 
(1.40) (1.04) (0.59) 
Loans2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.25) (0.11) (1.11) 
Grants 0.000 -0.004 0.007 
 
(0.18) (1.59) (2.79)*** 
Grants2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(1.96)** (0.44) (3.17)*** 
Inf  -0.000  
  
(5.86)*** 
 
ICRG  0.038  
  
(0.81) 
 
Oil  -0.382  
  
(2.90)*** 
 
_cons 2.895 2.576 2.696 
 
(48.93)*** (17.37)*** (48.14)*** 
Chi2  330.38 390.09 1,457.32 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2  . . 0.45 
N 1,944 1,154 1,897 
Notes: As for Table 31.2 except estimated using panel Random Effects 
(RE), given nature of additional variables (all aid variables 
insignificant using FE), or panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) 
model in final column (almost identical results for aid t-3 or not 
lagged). 
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Table 31.4: Accounting for Institutional Quality (FGLS estimator) 
 Bottom 25% on ICRG Bottom 50% on ICRG 
 Aid t-5 Aid t-10 Aid t-5 Aid t-10 
GDPpc -3.178e-4 -4.637e-4 -2.620e-4 -2.890 e-4 
 
(1.20) (1.77)* (1.71)* (1.89)* 
AGR 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.40) (0.22) 
IND 0.045 0.055 0.035 0.039 
 
(1.09) (1.29) (1.81)* (1.88)* 
M -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.52) (0.77) (0.64) (0.68) 
X -0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.001 
 
(0.28) (0.21) (0.39) (0.13) 
Loans -0.015 -0.103 -0.016 -0.032 
 
(0.43) (0.78) (0.92) (1.00) 
Loans2 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.43) (0.39) (0.89) (0.55) 
Grants -0.053 -0.186 -0.045 -0.059 
 
(0.73) (1.12) (1.79)* (0.96) 
Grants2 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.72) (0.90) (1.53) (0.34) 
_cons 2.972 3.481 2.546 2.618 
 
(1.53) (1.72)* (2.94)*** (2.80)*** 
Chi2  3.05 4.82 14.13 16.10 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 221 217 528 514 
Notes: As for Table 31.1 except estimated using estimated using a 
feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimator with panel-
specific AR(1) process; sample split by ICRG ranking. 
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Table 31.5: Sub-period Averaged Panel, 1980-2010 
 Aid not lagged Aid lagged one period 
GDPpc 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.26) (0.58) (1.00) (1.18) 
AGR -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
 
(7.18)*** (7.11)*** (6.96)*** (6.97)*** 
IND -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(4.23)*** (4.21)*** (3.16)*** (3.35)*** 
M 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(2.37)** (2.91)*** (2.62)*** (2.86)*** 
X -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.89) (1.46) (1.38) (1.50) 
Aid 0.268  0.698  
 
(0.82) 
 
(2.20)** 
 
Aid2 -0.723  -1.014  
 
(1.51) 
 
(2.10)** 
 
Loans  -0.793  -0.588 
  
(0.95) 
 
(0.75) 
Loans2  -6.369  18.800 
  
(0.42) 
 
(1.42) 
Grants  0.381  0.585 
  
(1.09) 
 
(1.72)* 
Grants2  -1.109  -1.012 
  
(1.93)* 
 
(1.79)* 
_cons -1.699 -1.729 -1.758 -1.776 
 
(21.46)*** (22.04)*** (21.29)*** (22.00)*** 
F  9.89 8.39 9.81 7.91 
P  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2  0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
N 725 752 665 687 
 
Notes: As for Table 31.2 except FE with panel of 4-year averages. Results for Grants 
and Loans (second and fourth columns) similar if each entered separately.  
Source: Morrissey et al (2014), Tables 1 and 2. 
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Appendix Table 31.A1: Sample Country List 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Asia and the Pacific 
(AsiaPac) 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) 
1. Angola 
2. Benin 
3. Botswana 
4. Burkina Faso 
5. Burundi 
6. Cameroon 
7. Cape Verde 
8. Central African Republic 
9. Chad 
10. Comoros 
11. Congo, Dem. Rep. 
12. Congo, Rep. 
13. Côte d'Ivoire 
14. Djibouti 
15. Equatorial Guinea 
16. Eritrea 
17. Ethiopia 
18. Gabon 
19. Gambia, The 
20. Ghana 
21. Guinea 
22. Guinea-Bissau 
23. Kenya 
24. Lesotho 
25. Liberia 
26. Madagascar 
27. Malawi 
28. Maldives 
29. Mali 
30. Mauritius 
31. Mozambique 
32. Namibia 
33. Niger 
34. Nigeria 
35. Rwanda 
36. São Tomé and Principe 
37. Senegal 
38. Seychelles 
39. Sierra Leone 
40. Sudan 
41. Swaziland 
42. Tanzania 
43. Togo 
44. Uganda 
45. Zambia 
46. Zimbabwe 
1. Afghanistan  
2. Bangladesh 
3. Bhutan  
4. Cambodia 
5. Fiji  
6. Indonesia  
7. Kiribati  
8. Kyrgyz Republic  
9. Lao PDR 
10. Myanmar 
11. Nepal  
12. Pakistan 
13. Palau  
14. Papua New Guinea  
15. Philippines 
16. Samoa  
17. Solomon Islands  
18. Sri Lanka  
19. Tajikistan   
20. Timor-Leste 
21. Tonga  
22. Vanuatu  
 
 
1. Antigua and Barbuda  
2. Belize  
3. Bolivia  
4. Costa Rica 
5. Dominica  
6. Dominican Republic  
7. Ecuador  
8. El Salvador  
9. Grenada  
10. Guatemala 
11. Guyana  
12. Haiti 
13. Honduras 
14. Jamaica 
15. Nicaragua 
16. Panama 
17. Paraguay  
18. Peru  
19. St. Kitts and Nevis  
20. St. Lucia  
21. St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines  
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Appendix Table 31.A2: Variable Descriptions and Sources 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Data Source 
Tax Tax revenue excluding grants, % of 
GDP 
ICTD  GRD database  
AGR Share of agriculture (value added), % 
of GDP 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
IND Share of industry (value added), % of 
GDP 
World Bank, WDI 
GDPpc GDP per capita, current US$ World Bank, WDI 
Imports Value of total imports, % of GDP World Bank, WDI 
Exports Value of total exports, % of GDP World Bank, WDI 
Aid Net aid (excluding repayments on 
principal), % of GDP 
OECD-ǯ
calculations 
Grants Grants, % of GDP OECD-ǯ
calculations 
Loans Net loans (excluding repayments), % 
of GDP 
OECD-ǯ
calculations 
oil Crude oil producer, dummy variable CIA World Factbook and Gupta et 
al (2004) 
inflation Inflation rate, year-on-year % IMF, World Economic Outlook 
Database 
icrg Corruption index, ascending scale 0-6  International Country Risk Guide 
but taken from Gupta et al (2004) 
and averaged over the period 
1985-1996. 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 31.A3: Descriptive Statistics (Annual Panel) 
 
 N mean sd Min Max 
Tax 2291     13.71 6.62 1.16 57.71 
AGR 2441  25.48 15.11 1.50 94.00 
IND 2437 25.28 12.27 1.90 95.70 
GDPpc 2584 1497.24 2122.73 64.35 27816.50 
Imports 2517 46.40 24.64 0.12 209.02 
Exports 2514 34.15 21.54 0.18 166.36 
Aid 2529 6.98 10.78 -2.85 241.68 
Grants 2546 6.83 10.29 0.001 241.68 
Loans 2428 0.28 2.04 -34.54 42.89 
inflation 2641 54.11 563.44 -72.73 23760.49 
icrg 1571 2.55 0.91 0.28 5.00 
Notes: Annual data, 1980-2010; all variables as ratios of GDP except per capita 
GDP; sd denotes standard deviation. Extremes are:  GDPpc min ± Liberia, 
1995; GDPpc max ± Equatorial Guinea, 2008; imports min ± Maldives, 
1981; exports max ± Myanmar, 2003; naidgdp max ± Palau, 1994; inflation 
min ± Zimbabwe, 2007; inflation max ± Congo DRC, 1994. 
 
 
 
